Foucault's critique of political reason: Individualization and totalization by Savoia P.
Foucault’s Critique of Political Reason: 
Individualization and Totalization*
por Paolo Savoia**
* This paper results from my doctoral research funded by the University of Pisa on Foucault and the political history of psychiatry in the late 19th century. 
Many of the ideas presented here have been deeply discussed with Arnold I. Davidson over the past few years, and I would like to thank him. Many thanks 
also to Luca Paltrinieri for the discussions on ethics and neo-liberalism, and to Elisabetta Roggero for the Gramscian advice.
** PhD en Filosofía de la Università di Pisa, Italia. Estudiante del doctorado en el Departamento de Historia de la Ciencia, Harvard University, Estados 
Unidos. Correo electrónico: savoia@fas.harvard.edu
AbsTRACT: 
This paper tries to sketch the continuity between the topics of government and subjectification and that of discipline and 
bodies in Foucault’s work by assessing the pervasiveness and the importance of the two poles of what Foucault himself, in a 
Kantian fashion, called a critique of political reason: individualization and totalization. In the first place, I will sketch the mode 
of functioning of “government” with reference to the pastorate invented by the Christian Church, showing that the theme of 
government and of its historical origins appears for the first time when Foucault talks about the disciplinary powers of nor-
malization of 19th-century psychiatry. In the second place, I will approach directly the logic of strategy that makes intelligible 
the relationships between government and discipline. Finally, these two concepts will be included in what Foucault called the 
double modern political rationality, and the persistence of this topic, in different forms, in many of his historico-philosophical 
analyses, and above all as the two sides of what he famously called bio-power. The main claim is that the relationship between 
the concepts of governmentality (the effect of which is totalization) and discipline (the effect of which is individualization) is 
neither one of conceptual incompatibility nor one of chronological succession in the development of Foucault’s thought, but 
rather a relation of interdependence that needs to be pointed out and further articulated in order to understand and pursue 
a critique of modern political reason.
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La Crítica de Foucault a la razón política: individualización y totalización
REsUMEn 
Este documento trata de bosquejar la continuidad entre la temáticas de gobierno y subjetivización, y aquellas referentes a la 
disciplina y los cuerpos en el trabajo de Foucault, mediante la evaluación de la presencia e importancia de los dos polos de 
lo que el mismo Foucault, en un estilo kantiano, llamó una crítica a la razón política: individualización y totalización. En primer 
lugar, describiré la forma de funcionamiento del “gobierno” con referencia al poder pastoral inventado por la iglesia cristiana, 
demostrando que el tema del gobierno y sus orígenes históricos aparecen por primera vez en Foucault cuando habla sobre los 
poderes disciplinarios de la normalización en la psiquiatría del siglo XIX.  En segundo lugar, haré una aproximación directa ha-
cia la lógica de la estrategia que hace inteligible la relación entre gobierno y disciplina.  Finalmente, estos dos conceptos serán 
incluidos en lo que Foucault llama la doble razón política moderna, y la persistencia de este tema, en diferentes formas, en 
muchos análisis histórico-filosóficos, y sobre todo como las dos caras de lo que él llamó famosamente bio-poder. La principal 
afirmación es que la relación entre los conceptos de gubernamentalidad (el efecto por el cual se da la totalización) y la discip-
lina (el efecto por el cual se da la individualización) no es ni una incompatibilidad conceptual ni una sucesión cronológica  en 
el desarrollo del pensamiento de Foucault, sino más bien una relación de interdependencia que necesita ser resaltada para 
una futura articulación, con el fin de entender y continuar hacia la crítica de la razón política moderna.
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PALAbRAs CLAvE
Gubernamentalidad, disciplina, razón política moderna, Gramsci, subjetividad.
A crítica de Foucault à razão política: individualização e totalização 
REsUMo
Este documento tenta esboçar a continuidade entre a temática de governo e subjetivação, e aquelas referentes à disciplina 
e aos corpos no trabalho de Foucault, mediante a avaliação da presença e importância dos dois polos do que o mesmo Fou-
cault, em um estilo kantiano, chamou uma crítica à razão política: individualização e totalização. Em primeiro lugar, descreve-se 
a forma de funcionamento do “governo” com relação ao pastoreio idealizado pela Igreja Cristã, demonstrando que o tema 
do governo e suas origens históricas aparecem pela primeira vez em Foucault quando ele fala sobre os poderes disciplinares 
da normalização na psiquiatria do século XIX. Em segundo lugar, será feita uma aproximação direta à lógica da estratégia que 
faz inteligível a relação entre governo e disciplina. Finalmente, estes dois conceitos serão incluídos no que Foucault chama de 
dupla razão política moderna, e a persistência desse tema, em diferentes formas, em muitas análises histórico-filosóficas, e, 
sobretudo, como as duas caras do que ele chamou famosamente biopoder. Pode-se afirmar que a relação entre os conceitos 
de governamentalidade (o efeito pelo qual se dá a totalização) e a disciplina (o efeito pelo qual se dá a individualização) não é 
nem uma incompatibilidade conceitual nem uma sucessão cronológica no desenvolvimento do pensamento de Foucault, mas 
sim é uma relação de interdependência que precisa ser ressaltada para uma futura articulação, com o objetivo de entender e 
continuar em direção da crítica da razão política moderna.
PALAvRAs CHAvE 
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In the past few years many scholars, influenced by 
the publication of Foucault’s lectures of the 1980s, have 
undertaken to show the continuities and compatibilities 
between the themes of power and governmentality, and 
the themes of the so-called “late” Foucault, such as the 
care of the self, parrhesia, etc. But on the other hand, it 
would be interesting to point out the links between the 
topics of government and subjectification and that of 
discipline and bodies, as developed in the courses of the 
early 1970’s, especially those on psychiatric power and 
its extension as power of normalization. 
My paper tries to sketch this continuity by assessing the 
pervasiveness and the importance of the two poles of what 
Foucault himself, in a Kantian fashion, called a critique of 
political reason: individualization and totalization. I argue 
that Foucault wanted to find out the historical conditions 
of possibility for the exercise of power in modern societies, 
namely governmentality (the regulation of totalities) and 
discipline (the regulation of individualities).
First, I will present the mode of functioning of “gover-
nment” with reference to the pastorate invented by the 
Christian Church, showing that the theme of govern-
ment and of its historical origins appears for the first 
time when Foucault talks about the disciplinary powers 
of normalization of 19th century psychiatry. Second, I will 
approach directly the logic of strategy that makes intelligi-
ble the relationships between government and discipline. 
Finally, these two concepts will be included in what Fou-
cault called the double modern political rationality, and 
the persistence of this topic, in different forms, in many of 
his historico-philosophical analyses, and above all as the 
two sides of what he famously called bio-power.
My main claim is that the relationship between the 
concepts of governmentality (the effect of which is to-
talization) and discipline (the effect of which is indivi-
dualization) is neither one of conceptual incompatibility 
nor one of simple chronological succession in the deve-
lopment of Foucault’s thought, but rather a relation of 
interdependence that needs to be pointed out and fur-
ther articulated in order to understand and to pursue 




a critique of modern political reason.1 This is not just a 
matter of philology but rather a matter of pursuing one 
of many possible interpretations of Foucault’s complex 
thought. Both the publication of the late courses at the 
Collège de France and the subsequent focus by commen-
tators on the topics developed in these courses, such as 
ancient practical philosophy, spiritual exercises, and 
parrhesia, could lead us to think that governmentality 
was for Foucault just one moment of passage, a sort of 
transitional object, toward the deployment of a new in-
terest in ethics and subjectivity, or that governmenta-
lity ended up being absorbed by the ethics of the self.2 
 This paper aims to show that even if an ethics of the self 
took the main stage in the late courses, we do not have 
to forget the politics of the self, nor how much ethics and 
politics of the self are intertwined in Foucault’s courses 
of the 1970s, which are the ones that are most interes-
ting for the purposes of this paper and from a political 
point of view. The reference to Gramsci I will make at 
the end must be read in this light, in other words as an 
attempt, even if at an embryonic stage, to firmly main-
tain Foucault’s thought in the field of political philoso-
phy, and to argue that his approach is not incompatible 
with a Marxist one. On the other hand, some other 
commentators have argued that the concept of gover-
nmentality in the courses of the late 1970s implies so-
mething like a conversion of Foucault to liberalism, or 
at least to some of the principles of the liberal traditions 
he discusses, either praising this shift or criticizing it.3 
The present paper disagrees with these interpretations, 
and argues that Foucault’s thought remains one of the 
best critical tools we have to understand the dominance 
of neo-liberal thought and politics, at least in the West. 
1 On this point see Gordon, Burchell and Miller (1991); Barry, Osborne and 
Rose (1996); Donzelot and Gordon 2008; Binkley and Capetillo (2009). 
2 The literature is expanding, but see Davidson (1994); Adorno (1996); 
Gros and Levy (2003); Detel (2005); Cremonesi (2008); Bernini (2011). 
Also, while I think that, since Foucault has always been interested in 
subjectivity as a process, we can easily understand his interest and 
fascination with ancient ethics, on the other hand understanding 
his deep and prolonged study of ancient philosophy seems to be more 
difficult, at least with respect to his previous work. Perhaps there 
has been too much insistence on the continuity between his produc-
tion of the 1970s and that of the 1980s, and it would be interesting 
–which would require another paper– to point out the ruptures and 
discontinuities that exist between the two periods.
3 For example, Ewald (1986) and Pezet (2007) praise Foucault’s assumed 
liberalism, while Pestaña (2010) blames it. A good essay by Grenier 
and Orléan (2007) presents a nuanced assessment of Foucault’s libe-
ral “temptation”. For an overview of understandings and misunders-
tandings on Foucault and neo-liberalism see Lemke (2011).
Government and Discipline
In his 1977-78 course on Security Territory Population, Foucault 
explores power practices primarily at the level of their 
political exercise, of the exercise of political sovereign-
ty, thus shifting his attention from previous analyses 
of powers of normalization. In any event, I will try to 
show the existence of strong links between two sets of 
courses –Security Territory Population/The Birth of Biopolitics 
and Psychiatric Power/Abnormal– by focusing on the con-
cept of government, leaving aside the historical specifi-
city of Foucault’s analyses. 
The lecture of February 1st concerns the use itself of 
the word “government”. Foucault’s hypothesis is that 
during the sixteenth century the general problem of 
an art of government flourished, in all of its various 
meanings: the government of oneself, the government 
of souls and conduct, the government of children, and 
finally the government of the State (Foucault 2007). As 
we will see, we can find here the genealogical origin of 
a series of important questions about the ways in which 
power relations work, and about the birth of the human 
sciences; questions that will be summarized by the con-
cept of governmentality. Foucault, while introducing this 
new methodological grid, says at the same time that 
government is neither a substitute for discipline, nor a 
way of suggesting the disappearance of the question of 
sovereignty from modern political discourses. Rather, 
the notion of government opens up a new dimension of 
analysis; the individuation of a general kind of power 
relations that goes hand in hand with discipline and 
sovereignty (Foucault 2007). Foucault clearly indicates 
the stakes for the introduction of this new concept of 
governmentality –which is both a methodological tool 
and the object of a historical inquiry– when he sum-
marizes the three intended meanings. First, is “«the 
ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analy-
ses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow 
the exercise of this very specific [...] power that has the 
population as its target, political economy as its major 
form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its 
essential technical instruments” (Foucault 2007, 108). 
Second, is “the tendency, the line of force, that [...] has 
constantly led towards the pre-eminence over all other 
types of power [...] of the type of power that we can call 
‘government’”, which is also the matrix of the princi-
pal forms of knowledge in our societies” (Foucault 2007, 
108-109). Third, is something that hints at the process 
of “governamentalization” of the modern State, where 
the State is understood as the historical correlate of 
practices of government (Foucault 2007, 109). 
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The second point is the one I want to analyze here, 
which concerns what kind of power we understand by 
the term “government” in its relationships with parti-
cular forms of knowledge. 
The semantic field covered by the concept of govern-
ment includes, according to Foucault, the notions of a 
movement in space, of material subsistence, of medi-
cal and spiritual direction towards health and salvation, 
and finally it always refers to an intercourse, to proces-
ses of exchange between individuals. Clearly, the objects 
of government are not things but people, individuals or 
groups. The origins of this form of power are to be found 
–the lecture goes on– in the practices of pastoral power 
and spiritual direction. Even if these ideas and practices 
originated in the pre-Christian East, Foucault argues 
that it is only with the birth of the Christian Church that 
the pastorate, as an autonomous kind of power, has been 
crystallized in a series of precise mechanisms and insti-
tutions, both modifying its Eastern form and appropria-
ting certain Greek and Roman techniques of direction. 
Thus, for Foucault, the history of pastoral power as we 
know it –pastoral power which, “is doubtless something 
from which we have still not freed ourselves” (Foucault 
2007, 148)– begins with the birth of the Christian form of 
the pastorate. The three main innovations of the Chris-
tian pastorate revolve around the relationships between 
salvation, obedience and truth: 
1) At the level of salvation, we notice that the pastor is 
placed in a subtle and complex network of recipro-
cal moral links and shared responsibilities with the 
members of the flock he governs. These bounds con-
cern the individuals’ capabilities, their merits and 
faults, and the details of their actions, and the pastor 
could arrive at the point in which he has to sacrifice 
himself for the flock’s good. 
2) Obedience of each individual to the pastor becomes an 
end in itself –the pastor’s conduction has no other 
goal outside of the relationship between the master 
and the disciple, and it reveals an entire practice of 
submission of one individual to another individual. 
This field of generalized and individualized obedien-
ce has no other end than the mortification of the con-
ducted individual’s own will. 
3) As for the problem of truth, Foucault tells us that of 
course the pastor has to teach the revealed truth 
of the Scriptures, but that the main innovation of 
the pastorate resides elsewhere. In the first place, the 
pastor’s teaching must be a direction of the daily con-
duct of the members of the flock: this teaching must 
pass through constant observation and supervision of 
every individual’s conduct in order to form a corpus 
of knowledge of their behavior. In the second place, 
the pastor uses and modifies techniques of direction 
of conscience that come from ancient philosophy. The 
function of Christian examination of conscience is not 
to assure the individual’s mastery of himself; rather, 
the individual has to tell the director what he has 
done, what he has experienced, what he is, and the 
hidden thoughts that inhabit his mind. The examina-
tion of conscience is a way of better fixing the relation-
ship of subordination to the other and, at the same 
time, for the conducted individual to be subjected to 
the truth he or she tells about him or herself. This con-
nection between examination of conscience and direc-
tion of conscience implies that the directed individual 
tells the truth about himself, the formation of a kind 
of truth, the effect of which is the intensification of a 
power/knowledge relation, namely the process of in-
dividualization that produces a specific kind of subject 
through a mechanism of subjection. Foucault indica-
tes what is at stake in this genealogy of the pastorate: 
“What the history of the pastorate involves, therefo-
re, is the entire history of procedures of human indivi-
dualization in the West. Let’s say also that it involves 
the history of the subject” (Foucault 2007, 184).
Five years before this series of lectures, Foucault gave a de-
tailed description of what he called “psychiatric power”. 
Here his main starting point, which involved a critique of 
some of the things he had previously said about the his-
tory of madness, is that we can understand the history of 
psychiatry only if we investigate the kind of power that 
is exercised inside of the asylum, namely “disciplinary 
power”. Foucault offered here, in a lecture on November 
21, 1973, speaking about the psychiatric power, the first 
description of what became the main arguments of Dis-
cipline and Punish. Four points characterize the famous 
disciplinary apparatus (they are well known, so I’ll be 
very brief about them): 1) Discipline tends to be a total 
hold, an exhaustive capture of the individual’s body, 
actions, and behavior; it shapes the individuality itself 
by managing the space and time the individual inha-
bits; 2) Discipline functions as a constant, continuous 
and anonymous control: in a disciplinary apparatus one 
is perpetually under someone else’s gaze, always obser-
ved; discipline looks forward to the future, when it will 
become a habit; 3) Discipline needs to record through a 
process of permanent writing everything the individual 
does and says, because this permanent writing allows the 
disciplinary apparatus to accumulate sets of precise infor-
mation about individuals, and therefore to intervene pre-




ventively on their acts and thoughts; 4) Discipline follows 
a principle of constant distribution and classification of 
individuals, a principle that always produces something 
like a residue, which is the unclassifiable, namely the ab-
normal (Foucault 2006). 
What I would like to emphasize here is that, when Fou-
cault wants to account for the concrete psychiatric sce-
nes of the relation between doctors and patients, he 
stops using the disciplinary vocabulary and begins to 
use the same terms he later employs, as we have seen, 
to characterize the pastorate as one of the genealogical 
matrixes of governmentality. Even though Foucault is 
not here aware of the distinction between two kinds of 
power, we can easily recognize the dynamics he later 
calls “government”. The relationship between the physi-
cian and the patient is in fact described as a relation of 
direction (a religious word whose origin should be studied 
–claims Foucault), which aims to put the disordered will 
of the mad man in a state of obedience with respect to the 
physician’s actions and discourse (see, for example Fou-
cault 2006). Moreover, one of the most constant features 
of the psychiatric power is that the patient has to state 
the truth about him or herself, she has to tell her story, 
and she has to tell it to the psychiatrist who hears it, jud-
ges it and validates it. Truth-telling is one of the main 
components of the process of individual subjection, un-
derstood both as the relation of subjection to someone, 
and the self-formation of a positive identity.
Abnormal, the course Foucault gave in 1974-75, the year 
after the course on psychiatric power, focuses on the ex-
tension of this power outside of the asylum, and on its 
pervasiveness in the 19th century in the shape of what 
he calls “power of normalization”. It hasn’t been poin-
ted out very often that this is the context in which the 
very word “government” appears for the first time in 
Foucault’s work as a specific technical concept. In his 
own terms, the Classical Age invented, among other 
things for which it is much more praised, “an ‘art of go-
verning’” in the sense of the government of children, of 
the mad, of the poor and of the workers. Foucault claims 
that the term “government” here indicates three things: 
1) a juridico-political theory of power centered on the 
notion of the will and its alienation, representation and 
transfer; 2) a complex State apparatus; and finally –so-
mething closer to what will be his second meaning, em-
ployed in his 1977-78 course; 3) a general technique of the 
exercise of power that does not coincide with an institu-
tion or an apparatus, but that has discipline as its main 
exemplification and that aims to produce a global effect 
of normalization of men and women (Foucault 2003). 
To characterize this kind of power Foucault refers to 
the work of the great historian of medicine and the life 
sciences, Georges Canguilhem, and particularly to his 
description of the norm as something that brings with 
it both a principle of qualification and of correction –or, 
in Humean terms, description and prescription– as so-
mething that does not exclude and reject but rather that 
positively intervenes and incites (Foucault 2003). 
A logic of Strategy 
Here are two general definitions of government and go-
vernmentality that Foucault published a few years later: 
Basically, power is less a confrontation between two 
adversaries or their mutual engagement than a ques-
tion of “government”. This word must be allowed the 
very broad meaning it had in the sixteenth century [...]; 
it designated the way in which the conduct of indivi-
duals or of groups might be directed [...]. To govern, in 
this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of 
others (Foucault 2000a, 341).
This encounter between the technologies of domina-
tion of others and those of the self I call ‘governmenta-
lity (Foucault 1997a, 225).
Government is thus the activity of conducting the conduct 
of other people through a power relation, a production 
of truth, and the regulated and guided action of the 
conducted subject on itself. Governing means structu-
ring the field of other people’s possible actions, a field 
which is in its turn organized around the axes of power, 
knowledge and the self. Foucault’s mention of possibility is 
here referred to as the specific dimension of the techno-
logies of the self, the space –always related to power rela-
tions and fields of knowledge– of the techniques that an 
individual operates on itself in order to modify its body, 
its soul, its psyche, its conduct, its thoughts. I think that 
the notion of government can be defined as a methodological tool that 
allows Foucault to take into account power relations, truth games and 
the operations that a subject performs on itself in the same process by 
which it comes into being as a subject. 
This is why I don’t think that the introduction of the no-
tion of government should be seen as a sort of paradigm 
shift in Foucault’s analyses of power, but rather as the 
general analytical tool that allowed him to describe his 
field of inquiry as that of the intertwining dimensions of 
power, knowledge and ethics. Despite some ambiguous 
texts, I think that government is not a mere substitute 
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for discipline, but a concept introduced to conceive the 
broad stakes that revolve around a power relation. As 
we have seen before, Foucault’s description of discipli-
nary power does not fully account for the plurality and 
richness of psychiatric power; rather, its extension on 
the abnormal needed to be accounted for in terms of gover-
nment. Discipline and government are not incompati-
ble with each other, because the notion of government 
is broader, covering a larger sphere of phenomena. I 
think that in the case of psychiatric power it hints to the 
overlapping functioning of disciplinary mechanisms, 
of practices of individual direction, and of procedures 
for extracting the truth about individuals. The result is 
the production of a subject who has at its disposal –so 
to speak– structured fields of possible actions and possi-
ble ways of experiencing him or herself. By government, 
therefore, we have to understand something more than 
a force relation: it is a way of defining the space of power relations 
within a historico-philosophical analysis of the relationships between 
power, knowledge and forms of subjectivity.
The relationships between discipline and government 
can be thought of in terms of what Foucault once called 
a strategic logic, a logic of strategy, as opposed to a dialec-
tic logic. This kind of logic does not put to work contra-
dictory terms within the field of the homogeneous and 
does not promise a final unity, but establishes possible 
connections between heterogeneous elements that re-
main heterogeneous even if they are historically con-
nected (Foucault 2008). I think this is a very important 
point by Foucault, a sort of key to understanding both 
his philosophical and his historical approaches. But 
let’s focus on our topic. 
In this way, to take up my example, the distribution of acts 
and gestures in the space and time of the asylum, typical 
of disciplinary techniques, can be structurally linked, 
from a historical point of view, to different relationships 
of highly individualized obedience and direction. 
Let’s take an example. In his lectures on psychiatric 
power Foucault insists on the case of the formation of 
a regular and permanent army in the 18th century, an 
example he also uses in his course on governmentality in 
1977-78. In the first case, he wants to exemplify the dis-
ciplinary mechanism, while in the second he wants to 
point out an art of government understood as a conduc-
tion of conducts. From the point of view of discipline, 
the army deploys a set of techniques for identification, 
surveillance, and recognition of individuals, in order to 
fight against the phenomenon of desertion, which in its 
turn emerged only against the background of the disci-
plinary apparatus and of the obligation to serve in the 
army (Foucault 2006). From the point of view of gover-
nmentality, the phenomenon of desertion can be read 
in terms of a moral and political resistance: the analysis 
of the army in terms of government and conduct allows 
Foucault to pinpoint the specific ethical dimension of 
the army as a disciplinary apparatus. Since joining the 
army and waging war became mandatory, it also became 
a moral and political conduct, the behavior of every good 
citizen of the State. This means that a particular set of 
acts, orchestrated within the framework of discipline, is 
invested by new power practices, a new regime of truth, 
and a new kind of relationship to oneself (Foucault 
2007). Desertion, understood in terms of discipline as 
an abnormal conduct, as that which diverges from the 
military apparatus, thus becomes an ethical and politi-
cal counter-conduct when seen from the point of view 
of governmentality. Therefore, we are not confronted 
here with a choice between two competing and mutually 
exclusive concepts, but rather with a way of enriching 
the analysis of a particular historical phenomenon by 
making intelligible the relationships between heteroge-
neous elements. Moreover, the historical roots of both 
sides of the emergence of the army are to be individua-
ted, according to Foucault, in the Christian pastorate. 
In a note in the manuscript of The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault 
writes that “liberal governmentality was both legalis-
tic and normalizing, disciplinary regulation being the 
switch-point between the two aspects” (Foucault 2008, 
260). Once again, there is no incompatibility between 
government and discipline, but rather an explicit con-
nection. Moreover, in the same note Foucault defines 
discipline as “an ‘individualizing’ governmentality” 
(Foucault 2008, 260), the individual dimension of gover-
nment, where the government itself, as a general type 
of power, seems to be the switch point between disci-
plinary techniques that function through psychological 
sciences, and the liberal style of government that acts 
through political economy. 
I don’t want to oversimplify and hide the problems 
that arise in the historical interpretation of the overlap 
between governmental security apparatuses and disci-
plinary powers, but my goal here is a general and philo-
sophical one. I present here one last passage to support my 
claim. In an important interview from 1984, Foucault dis-
tinguishes between power relations (or games of power), 
techniques of government, and states of domination. Go-
vernmental techniques are precisely in the middle, and I 
want to emphasize here that they work as a kind of brid-
ge, the tool that allows us to articulate the connections 




between power relations, games of truth and technolo-
gies of the self.
I am saying that “governmentality” implies the rela-
tionship of the self to itself, and I intend this concept of 
“governmentality” to cover the whole range of practices 
that constitute, define, organize, and instrumentalize 
the strategies that individuals in their freedom can use 
in dealing with each other (Foucault 1997b). 
Individualization and totalization 
It is possible to connect the introduction of governmen-
tality to another aspect of Foucault’s work. Foucault, in 
fact, came to describe in a general way the political ratio-
nality of our present precisely through the genealogy of 
pastoral power as a kind of government of individuals by 
means of their own truth. The logic of modern political 
rationality is summarized as a permanent integration of 
individuals in a totality and, vice versa, as a way of gover-
ning a totality in order to regulate individual conducts, 
namely a constant correlation between an increasing individuali-
zation and the reinforcement of a totality (Foucault 2000b; Fou-
cault 2000c). The concept of government provides the 
tool that allows us to articulate these forms of correla-
tion. We are able to clarify the formula omnes et singulatim 
if we take a look at two series of elements that keep in-
teracting with each other in all of the analyses Foucault 
made in the 1970s, starting from the courses on psychia-
try and the abnormal. Psychiatric power worked both 
through particular institutions, both public and private, 
and the State apparatus. What Foucault was interested 
in was, however, the mechanics of the kind of power 
which is the correlate and the condition of possibility of 
these two series of apparatuses. 
We can identify two closely intertwined logics of psychia-
tric power: on the one hand, a logic of the government of 
singular individuals in hospitals, asylums etc.; and on 
the other hand, a logic of public hygiene that works by 
monitoring the whole society and its population (and that 
goes as far as interfering with the penal apparatus and the 
definition of crimes). Since psychiatric power crossed its 
borders and became a general technology of normaliza-
tion, we can see a thorough example of this double logic, 
or double rationality. There are two processes which are 
logically distinct but chronologically coincident: elements 
outside of the curve of normality are individuated in the 
social body; these elements are then treated by practices 
of individual government aimed at restoring them back 
to the totality, or at separating them from it. This process 
is clearly circular, because the same norm that allows one 
to individuate abnormal elements in the totality is cons-
tituted through techniques of government of individuals 
that, in their turn, can be strengthen and modified by the 
practices of government of a totality. In other words, psy-
chiatric power is both individualizing and totalizing; it allows a perpe-
tual exchange between the government of a totality and the government 
of individuals. 
For example, the specific object we call “sexuality” emer-
ged in the same way from a process of medicalization and 
psychiatrization of certain behaviors. It thus became, 
Foucault argues in La volonté de savoir, the center of a double 
logic of power: anatomo-politics and bio-politics. On the 
one hand, we have the disciplinary power that invests 
the individual body; on the other, the forms of power that 
concern population as the totality of human beings consi-
dered from a biological point of view. And again, we can 
see government as the tool by which we can articulate 
the description of the interactions between disciplinary 
powers, whose target are the individuals, and security 
apparatuses, whose target is population. 
Foucault also describes a double functioning of the 
power of normalization in our societies, according to 
the two poles of discipline and security. “Normation” 
is the action of discipline, where the norm is prior to 
the normal and the abnormal, and normalization is the 
adaptation of individuals to this optimal goal fixated in 
advance. “Normalization”, in the strict sense, is exem-
plified by Foucault through a discussion of medical 
apparatuses of security against epidemics. Here the 
normal and the abnormal are prior to the norm: we 
have different curves of normality individuated in a 
collectivity, and then the norm will result as an inter-
play between these curves of normality (Foucault 2007). 
Finally, thanks to this double rationality we can indivi-
duate –I only say this in passing– the two main sciences 
that function as apparatuses of power/knowledge in 
our present, namely the psy sciences and the economic 
sciences, the homo psychologicus and the homo œconomicus as 
objects of scientific knowledge, of political government 
and of ethical self-elaboration. Again, this indicates 
both individualization and totalization. 
Foucault and Gramsci
The concept of governmentality allows us to connect 
two series of heterogeneous elements: on the one hand, 
psychiatry as the government of individuals, and sexua-
lity as anatomo-politics, discipline, normation, and the 
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psy sciences; on the other hand, psychiatry as public 
hygiene, and sexuality as bio-politics of the population, 
security apparatuses, normalization, and the econo-
mic sciences. As we have seen, I think that the idea of 
a double political rationality emerges from the courses 
on psychiatry, together with the beginning of the pro-
blematization of government, understood as the tool that 
opens up for inquiry the field of the multiple relations 
between power, knowledge and forms of subjectivity.
I want to conclude by suggesting a possible connection 
between Foucault and Antonio Gramsci, which needs to 
be deepened and better explored, on the question of the 
dynamics of resistence against this political rationality, 
parallel to that of the intertwining techniques of indivi-
dualization and totalization.4 I am referring to the brief 
Notebook 25, on the history of subaltern social groups and 
the problem of their disunity. Gramsci draws here a sketch 
of the dynamics through which a subaltern group emer-
ges, or could emerge, as an autonomous political subject 
starting from the very fact of its subjugation. Here we 
have visible what we could describe in Foucauldean terms 
as a process of subjectification that does not presuppose 
the previous existence of the political subject. We can see 
a political subject that emerges from within a power rela-
tion. So here are the six stages Gramsci individuates:
1) formation and diffusion of the subaltern group from 
previously existing but not organized social entities; 2) 
active or passive commitment of the subaltern group 
to the dominant political subjects (for Gramsci, these 
are the ones that own the means of production); 3) re-
novation of the strategy of the dominant political clas-
ses in order to confront the new subaltern groups; 4) 
formulation of partial and specific claims by the subal-
tern groups; 5) the subaltern groups start to make glo-
bal claims, but still with the language of the dominant 
group; and 6) the subaltern formulate new claims for 
a new form of autonomy with their own language and 
with their own specific practices (Gramsci 1975).
For Foucault and Gramsci subaltern groups or subjugated 
subjects are both the product of power relations and the 
active subjects of resistance. More specifically, Foucault 
tells us that in order to resist we have to escape the trap 
of the alternative between individuals and collectivities. 
Modern power functions precisely by integrating these 
two dimensions, so what Foucault suggests we have to 
4 The literature on Gramsci, critical theory and post-structuralism is 
vast and scattered. More punctual comparisons between Foucault 
and Gramsci can be read in Ives (2004), and Demirovic (2009).
do is to question the alternative between the individual 
and the collective. As always, the question that conclu-
des every discussion of Foucault’s work is the same: what 
can we do with it? 
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